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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
state tax notes®

by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University
of California Davis School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, Gamage and Shanske offer their fourth
and final article on the issue of taxation and
greenhouse gas mitigation. The authors defend
a border adjusted carbon tax against claims it
would violate the dormant commerce clause by
asserting the tax does not favor in-state
industries, but is instead a tax on a global
externality.
Introduction
This is our fourth and final essay considering
taxation and greenhouse gas mitigation. In our
prior essays, we began by laying out the policy
argument for a state-level carbon tax with border
adjustments. The argument, in brief, is that
levying a carbon tax makes the products and
services of the taxing state more expensive, and
thus border adjustments are needed so that a
carbon tax achieves more than economic harm to
the state that levies it.

We also explained the consensus that the
dormant commerce clause would prevent a state
from levying a carbon tax with border
adjustments. Again, the basic reason is
straightforward: A border adjustment would, by
definition, be a surcharge on goods and services
produced out of state. Thus, border adjustments
would seem to fly in the face of the core rationale
for the dormant commerce clause, namely
rejecting state protectionism.
We further distilled the doctrinal issues
surrounding border adjustments into three
questions:
• Can there be any special tax on imports,
even if it is the same as a tax on domestic
production?
• Could a state differentiate its border
adjustments between products based on
approximations of their carbon intensity if
such approximations take geography into
account?
• When questions 1 and 2 are answered in the
affirmative, how much approximation is
permissible?
Our most recent article concluded with one
doctrinal argument that border adjustment could
be permissible. That argument maintained that a
carefully crafted system for border adjustment
ought not fail dormant commerce clause scrutiny
because such an adjustment would not constitute
discrimination against out-of-state products and
services. If the adjustments are keyed only to
carbon intensity rather than geography, neither
the imposing state nor other states are inherently
advantaged or disadvantaged. We noted that the
Ninth Circuit accepted a similar argument
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regarding a California regulation, the Low
Carbon Fuel Standard, which accounts for carbon
1
intensity in roughly the same way.
In this article, we will lay out three additional
doctrinal arguments and a background
consideration, all of which support our
conclusion that a state-level carbon tax with
border adjustments could be permissible.
Facial Discrimination May Not Be Fatal
Because of the Complementary Tax Doctrine
We now explore arguments that do not rely on
the contention that a taxing scheme attuned to
carbon intensity is not discriminatory. This is of
particular interest because the Ninth Circuit was
2
split in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey —
a case that accepted an argument similar to that in
our prior essay.
One argument would be that a border
adjustment represents a complementary tax and,
as such, the prima facie discrimination is not
invalid because it “achiev[es] a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be achieved through
nondiscriminatory means.”3 The key modern
application of the doctrine is Henneford v. Silas
4
Mason Co., in which the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Washington’s imposition of a use tax on
out-of-state purchases to compensate for the sales
tax it imposed on in-state sales. Thus, if a court
does not accept the Rocky Mountain argument that
there is no discrimination, it might accept an
argument that the discrimination is justified
based on the complementary tax doctrine.
Certainly, if the carbon tax were identically
imposed on imports — that is, taking no account
of carbon intensity — the case looks pretty strong.
But what if, as seems important, a state did try to
take the carbon intensity of imports into account?

1

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2013).
2
Id.
3
Oregon Waste Systems Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality of State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93
(1994).
4
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.).
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A leading recent case on the doctrine, and one
seemingly similar to our scenario, is Oregon Waste
5
Systems. In that case, Oregon imposed a $2.25per-ton surcharge on waste imported from out of
state while charging 85 cents per ton for waste
6
generated in state. Oregon’s statute required that
the surcharge “be based on the costs to the State of
Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing
of solid waste generated out-of-state which are
7
not otherwise paid for.” While Oregon had a
colorable argument that its surcharge was
compensatory, it failed the demanding three-part
test needed to justify upholding a discriminatory
tax. Under that test, a special out-of-state burden
must be identified; the out-of-state surcharge
must approximate, but not exceed, the identified
burden; and the event that triggers the in-state
and out-of-state tax must be “substantially
8
equivalent.”
The Oregon scheme failed the first and third
prongs. The only identifiable charge was the
charge paid by in-state producers, but that was
only a third as much as charged to out-of-state
producers. Thus, there was no identifiable
burden, at least within the limits of the second
prong’s requirement that the charges not exceed
the in-state charge. The state countered that the
identified charge should take into account the
general taxes that in-state producers paid but that
out-of-state producers did not. Yet that argument
ran smack into prong three; the occasion for
paying a general property tax, for example, was
not substantially equivalent to that of paying a
special surcharge on imported waste. Indeed it
was a kind of Catch-22; the only way to satisfy the
first prong was to rely on other charges that failed
the third prong.
Taking a step back, if the Court accepted that
compensating for general taxes would suffice to
justify a facially discriminatory surcharge, it
seems likely that would lead to abuse and

5

Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). Cf. Jerome
R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John A. Swain,
State Taxation 4.14.[3][c] (2016) (arguing that making the
exception limited makes pragmatic and principled
sense).
6
Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 96.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 103.
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9

See also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
511 U.S. 641 (1994).
11
Id. at 644.
12
Cf. Rocky Mountain, at 730 F.3d at 1093 (California
fuel standard uses averages).
13
Lohman, 511 U.S. at 649-650.
10

calculate what can only be calculated
approximately; there is no underlying (known)
fact of the matter.
Formulary Apportionment as Model for
Approximation
The Court could still interpret Lohman
broadly. In particular, it might decide that the case
stands for the very general principle — there can
be no averaging, only a precisely known amount
can be compensated for. Or, relatedly, perhaps the
Court would conclude that thereis an underlying
fact about carbon intensity that can be discovered
without a formula. The Court should be
encouraged not to interpret Lohman by reference
to its formulary apportionment cases.
The third prong of the Complete Auto test, the
test for determining whether a tax scheme
violates the dormant commerce clause, bars
14
discrimination. That test is very similar, perhaps
identical, to the test for regulations. That is the
prong we have essentially been discussing, but
there is a second Complete Auto test prong, which
requires that a tax be fairly apportioned. Of
course, if a tax is not fairly apportioned, it is likely
discriminatory, but that prong is not wholly
duplicative. A typical apportionment formula, on
its face, applies to all firms in the same way,
whatever their location, but fair apportionment
requires that the chosen method of
apportionment be reasonable. The Court has long
accepted rough formulas for apportioning the
value or income of multistate enterprises, such as
using the relative amount of railroad track within
15
a state. This is an area in which the Court
accepted a reality on the ground, namely that

14

Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977).
15
See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); and Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390
U.S. 317, 324 (1968) (“A number of such formulas have
been sustained by the Court, even though it could not
be demonstrated that the results they yielded were
precise evaluations of assets located within the taxing
State”). Interestingly, Norfolk is the rare case in which
the Court did find a formula irrational because there
was a preexisting value against which the Court could
compare the value arrived at by formula. That is not the
case for carbon intensity.
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retaliation, and so Oregon Waste Systems was
sound.9 It is, however, quite another thing for a
state to adopt a tax on a broad new tax base,
namely carbon, and then to try to mitigate its
impact with border adjustments. That situation is
much more analogous to Henneford — the case
that upheld the use tax as a complement to the
sales tax.
Or, to return to the test, a border adjustment
would be based on an identified event — the
production of carbon — and that event is
substantially identical wherever it happens. With
prongs one and three covered, that brings us to
prong two — whether the border adjustment
calculation is close enough for purposes of the
dormant commerce clause — and herein,
perhaps, lies the trouble. Associated Industries of
10
Missouri v. Lohman is recent precedent that seems
to stand in the way.
Lohman was about local use taxes. Missouri
imposed a 1.5 percent average use tax at the state
level to compensate for the different sales tax rates
11
imposed by some 1,000 localities. The Court in
Lohman found that this average use tax violated
prong two of the complementary tax test — a
statewide average did not eliminate the
discrimination happening on all of the
transactions in which imported goods were
charged more than local goods.
Lohman suggests that the approximations that
would be the necessary basis for border
adjustments under a state-level carbon tax may
fail. After all, the state would need to use an
average or other kind of approximation to
12
determine the tax. And yet the border
adjustments we propose could be distinguished
from the average state-level sales tax at issue in
Lohman. That is not a case in which a statewide
average is essentially whitewashing local
discrimination, which was the Court’s concern in
13
Lohman. Here, the averages are being used to
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railroads were multistate enterprises the value of
which could not be precisely located in a given
state. The analogy with carbon production seems
evident.
Two key apportionment precedents are
16
particularly notable. First, there is Moorman. In
Moorman, a manufacturer based in Illinois
challenged Iowa’s use of a single-factor sales
method of apportionment for ascertaining where
the income of a multistate corporation was earned
(and therefore taxable). The Illinois manufacturer
noted that Illinois, like most states at the time,
used a three-factor method of apportionment.
That method looked to the relative proportion of
sales, property, and payroll that a multistate
corporation earned in a particular state. Iowa
used only the sales factor. That choice served to
increase the income apportionable to Iowa of an
Illinois business with Iowa sales, but to decrease
the apportionable income of an Iowa business
exporting to Illinois. Thus, Iowa’s then-solitary
use of the single sales factor seemed to advantage
its domestic businesses. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld Iowa’s use of the single sales factor. At the
heart of the Court’s reasoning was the observation
that it was not Iowa’s formula that discriminated
or was unreasonable; rather, it was the interaction
of Iowa’s system with the different systems of
other states. The Court refused to dictate and
17
enforce a uniform formula. Moorman therefore
stands for the principle that the Court will not
pick and choose between formulas even if a
chosen formula gives the state that adopts it an
edge (or at least an apparent edge).
18
The second important precedent is Trinova.
In Trinova, the challenge was to Michigan’s use of
formulary apportionment in connection with its
19
value added tax. The plaintiffs asserted that
value added could be more easily geographically
located than total firm value or income, and thus
use of a formula was unreasonable. The Court

16

Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978).
17
Id. at 278-279.
18
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 498
U.S. 358 (1991).
19
There was also a challenge to the formula as
discriminatory, a challenge the Court summarily
dismissed. Id. at 384-386.
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held otherwise. Presumably, Michigan could have
attempted to locate value added more precisely,
but the state was permitted to use an approximate
formula given the still significant complexity and
guesswork involved in locating value added.20
The formulary apportionment line of cases
thus provides an argument, by analogy, that
ought to buttress the use of approximate formulas
for making border adjustments. If Michigan could
use a formula rather than try to track down value
added, why can’t states do something similar
regarding carbon intensity? Or, put another way,
the plaintiffs in the formulary apportionment
cases regularly insisted that they knew, via
separate accounting, where the value or income of
their firms was located. The Court has repeatedly
rejected that contention; since locating multistate
21
firm value or income is like “slicing a shadow,”
the states were not required to accept the shadow
slices proffered by the plaintiffs. If that is true for
property value or income or value added, why
should that not be true for carbon intensity?
Sidebar: Application of the Spirit of the
Public Utility Exception?
It must be granted that the Court could reject
the fair apportionment analogy, instead holding
that what is an acceptable approximation under
the fair apportionment prong of the Complete Auto
test is not necessarily acceptable under the antidiscrimination prong. As for anti-discrimination,
no approximating is permitted. Yet there are hints
in the Court’s recent dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence that it will not reach out to
invalidate sensible state innovations.
We should remember that the dormant
commerce clause is federal constitutional
common law. The current dormant commerce
clause test for whether a tax passes constitutional
muster, the four-prong Complete Auto test, was a
result of a backward look at what the Court had

20

Trinova Corp., 498 U.S. at 379 (“The same factors
that prevent determination of the geographic location
where income is generated, factors such as functional
integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale, make it impossible to determine the
location of value added with exact precision”).
21
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463
U.S. 159, 192 (1983).
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22

Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274, 277-278. Cf. Jesse H.
Choper and Tung Yin, “State Taxation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach,”
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 199 (“The central problem with
Complete Auto is that its four prongs are functionally
overlapping and redundant in attempting to fulfill the
bedrock constitutional value served by judicial review
of state taxation of interstate commerce:
nondiscrimination against interstate commerce”).
23
The fourth prong, so-called fair relation. Complete
Auto, 453 U.S. at 609.
24
This is the first prong, substantial nexus, which was
held in Quill to require more substantial nexus than that
required by the due process clause. Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
25
The Court looks for the internal and external
consistency of a tax; those requirements are sometimes
placed under the anti-discrimination prong, sometimes
the fair apportionment. See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,
467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984) (internal consistency
required under fair apportionment and antidiscrimination prongs); and Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (internal and
external consistency under fair apportionment prong).
26
Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J. concurring).
27
United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 343
(2007).
28
Id. at 330.

29

Court essentially overturned a recent precedent
to allow localities to monopolize the local waste
processing business. One of us has argued
elsewhere that the best way to understand that
decision is that it was accepting of a new
30
economic reality. The waste management
industry used to be one in which competition was
possible. Yet as the environmental impact of waste
disposal has grown, so too has the expense of
treating waste properly. Thus, as was apparently
the case in the two-county region at issue in
United Haulers, waste management had become a
natural monopoly. That is, one very expensive
treatment plant could handle all the waste in the
region, and adding a second plant would only be
wasteful. In such a circumstance, the Court
narrowed earlier precedent to allow governments
to pursue an economically sensible solution to a
regional problem, namely the governments were
permitted to build one expensive plant and then
31
force local waste haulers to use it.
By analogy, the problem of reducing carbon
emissions is a new one, and one that transcends
state borders. The science and economics of
carbon leakage are hard to deny — or at least
inappropriate for a court to deny. Why should the
Court reject all the doctrinal arguments made
thus far only to hamstring state efforts to address
what the Court has already accepted is a major
32
problem? That is an apt place to review the
arguments thus far to see just how many
“offramps” are available to the Court, at least if
confronted by a well-designed system of border
tax adjustments (BTAs). First, following the
argument of Rocky Mountain, the Court can find
that there is simply no discrimination. Second, the
Court could accept that BTAs satisfy the
29

C & A Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383 (1994).
30
Darien Shanske, “The Supreme Court and the New
Old Public Finance: A New Old Defense of the Court’s
Recent Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,” 43
Urb. Law 659, 669 (2011).
31
The Court has made similar adjustments to its
doctrine in other, related, areas of law and, in particular,
rate regulation in which the Court ultimately decided to
leave the setting of utility rates to expert regulators (for
the most part). Id. at 714-716.
32
Massachusetts v.Environmental Protection Agency, 549
U.S. 497 (2007).
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done in actual cases — all while overturning large
parts of the doctrine to that point in the name of
22
forging a more pragmatic test. Since the advent
of the Complete Auto test in 1977, one prong has
become largely irrelevant,23 another prong has
24
taken on a surprising life of its own, and (at least)
two additional prongs are tucked into one of the
remaining two prongs.25 Thus, quite reasonably,
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote (with Justice
Clarence Thomas concurring), “I look forward to
the day when Complete Auto will take its rightful
place . . . among the other useless and discarded
tools of our negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.”26 Indeed, in a relatively recent
majority opinion written by Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr., the Court stated that the “dormant
Commerce Clause is not a roving license for
federal courts to decide what activities are
appropriate for state and local government to
undertake.”27
That strong language comes from the Court’s
28
2007 decision in United Haulers. In that case, the

© Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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complementary tax doctrine as it stands. Third,
the Court could accept that BTAs satisfy a slightly
revised complementary tax doctrine; even if the
BTAs contain approximations (as they must), they
are acceptable by analogy with formulary
apportionment. The Court should be propelled to
one of those routes by the same sense of its
institutional role as a federal court that led to the
United Haulers opinion.
But perhaps the Court will refuse to follow
these arguments. Or perhaps the uncertainty here
will, as a pragmatic matter, prevent the
implementation of a robust carbon tax with BTAs.
Is there another way to structure a carbon tax to
achieve the benefits of BTAs?
Alternative Design: Formulary Apportionment as
a Substitute for Border Adjustments
Up to this point we have been considering
formulary apportionment as an analogy for a
border adjustment. Yet the mere fact that those
adjustments would occur on imports (and
exports) arguably might be too great a hurdle to
clear with the Supreme Court. Fortunately, there
is still one additional possible approach: replace
border adjustments with formulary
apportionment.
Here is roughly how that might work. Instead
of taxing a refinery as it refines oil, the carbon tax
would tax the refining firm once a year in much
the same way states currently administer their
corporate income tax. For example, an oil refiner
would report how much oil it refined for use in
the state, but before that number became the basis
of the carbon tax, the state would apply an
apportionment formula based on the carbon
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33

intensity of the oil it imported. Thus, a firm that
imports oil would need to pay its carbon tax after
the amount of oil it imported was adjusted for the
carbon intensity of its source, among other
factors. As with current apportionment formulas,
a taxpayer should be able to challenge the
formula. Regardless of the statute, formulas can
be challenged as unconstitutional because they
are unreasonable. The Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act offers taxpayers the
possibility of additional relief, even if a formula
does not fall below the constitutional floor. That
should be the case with carbon formulary
apportionment as well.34
Using formulary apportionment to avoid the
need for border adjustments is not a novel idea.
That was part of the reform proposal of the
California Commission on the 21st Century
Economy (COTCE).35 The heart of the COTCE
proposal was a state-level VAT called a business
net receipts tax (BNRT). Yet imposing a broad
new tax, it was feared, would disadvantage
California businesses. The commission did not
believe it could impose border adjustments to
strip out — or impose — its new tax. The COTCE
proposal used formulary apportionment (only the
sales factor) to try to make up for the lack of
border adjustments. Unfortunately, and as critics
noted, formulary apportionment cannot replace

33

See Carol McAusland and Nouri Najjar, “The
Carbon-Added Tax: A CAT That Won’t Hunt,” Policy
Options, Oct. 2010, section 5, for more detailed
discussion of how such a system might work in terms of
estimating the cost of carbon embodied in products. See
also generally, Charles E. McLure Jr., “The CarbonAdded Tax: A CAT That Won’t Hunt, California Policy
Options,” Oct. 2010 (“The most efficient way to
implement a carbon tax is to impose it upstream. It is
true that an upstream carbon tax would not provide the
information required to calculate BTAs; it should be
necessary to calculate BTAs in some other ad hoc
way. . . . Fortunately, [border adjustments] would be
needed for trade only in a limited number of carbonintensive basic products that are traded heavily with
countries that do not limit CO2 emissions”).
34
UDITPA section 18.
35
California Commission on the 21st Century, Final
Report (2009).
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Conclusion: A Uniform Division of Carbon for
Tax Purposes Act?
Once one state made substantial progress
with the base for a carbon tax, other states could
copy the model and, ideally, coordinate their tax.
There are some partial models for this. Many
taxes, such as the sales tax and the corporate
income tax, began with specific states taking the
lead. And under federal pressure, the states
eventually coordinated their corporate income
taxes — at least somewhat. Also, the sales tax
represents a major tax base that the states exploit
and the federal government does not — in
dramatic contrast to any other federal system we
are aware of. Thus, the states adopting and
coordinating a new and significant tax base
would hardly be unprecedented and would not

36

Charles E. McLure Jr., “The Business Net Receipts
Tax: A Dog That Will Not Hunt,” 37 Hastings Const. L.Q.
745, 749-763 (2010); see also generally Kirk J. Stark,
“Houdini Tax Reform: Can California Escape Its Fiscal
Straitjacket?” California Policy Options 1 (Nov. 2010).
37
One of us delves into some of the complexities of
using sales as a proxy for income here: Darien Shanske,
“A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The
State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax
Complement,” 66 Tax L.Rev. 305, 344-347 (2013).

be, we believe, too difficult. Further, as we
explained at the outset, such actions by the states
can have significant impact.
We believe the constitutional issues would be
reduced as other states joined in the use of a
carbon tax. Suppose that California is the first
state to adopt a carbon tax. California does not use
38
any coal for the production of energy. By taking
carbon intensity into account, some California
industries are going to be hurt relative to out-ofstate competitors, but on the whole a court might
see that it is mostly out-of-state suppliers that
have their output labeled high intensity. As
explained above, we do not think that should
render the system unconstitutional, but the
argument is much easier to see if, say, Illinois,
were also to impose a carbon tax and do so in a
coordinated way with California. Illinois does
produce energy from coal.39 Illinois’s participation
thus makes matters particularly clear: The carbon
tax does not, by design or in effect, help in-state
40
industries. Rather, it is a tax on a global
externality.
In the end, we recognize the many reasons
states have to shy away from imposing a carbon
tax. Our argument is that the inability to impose
border adjustments in some form should not itself
be seen as an insuperable obstacle.


38

Energy Information Agency, California Energy
Production Estimates, 2014.
39
Energy Information Agency, Illinois Energy
Production Estimates, 2014.
40
It should be noted that according to the Energy
Information Agency, the carbon intensity of the total
energy produced in Illinois is actually a bit lower than
that used in California. (At least one reason is that
Illinois uses much more nuclear power than California.)
The intensity of energy produced in New York is lower
still. Thus, if those numbers were to be the basis of an
adjustment, California would start out by apportioning
less carbon intensity to many other states. See Energy
Information Agency, Carbon Intensity by State (20002014).
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border adjustments in that context. For instance,
actual exporters would have their BNRT reduced
by use of the single sales factor because only instate sales would be used in the formula, but
domestic producers who sell to the exporters
would not see any reductions because all of their
sales were in-state. That is because the design of
the BNRT did not allow the tax to be added or
subtracted on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
That criticism does not hold for a carbon tax,
at least in the form we are discussing. The carbon
tax would only be remitted by a handful of large
upstream producers; thus, there would not be the
problem of many businesses having the carbon
tax built into their prices without chance of rebate.
Further, the deep issue with relying on
apportionment in the context of a subnational
VAT is that sales are different from value added.
For a carbon tax, the formula would be measuring
carbon intensity, which is the same as the base of
37
the tax.

